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Abstract
Can input-trade liberalization increase the demand for managers? Imported inputs are an
important source of technology inows. Previous research on the implications of imported inputs
overlooked their potential e¤ect on the demand for managing the new incoming knowledge.
Adopting the case of India, this paper presents a rst empirical attempt to ll this gap. Using
detailed rm-level data that uniquely distinguishes between the compensations of managers
and non-managers, and exploiting the exogenous nature of Indias Eight-Plan trade reform,
we investigate the potential causal link between input-trade liberalization and the demand for
managers relative to non-managers. We nd that a decrease in input tari¤s increases the relative
demand for managers, primarily in domestic rms that use the imported inputs to produce
intermediate goods. Specically, a 10% drop in input tari¤s induces, on average, a 1-1.5%
increase in the compensation share of managers, manifested via increases in both their number
as well as average wages and bonuses. These patterns are: (i) observed across the rmssize
distribution; (ii) applicable for both exporting and non-exporting rms; (iii) stronger in family-
run rms that operate under exible labor market regulations; (iv) relatively more dominant
in the short-run. In addition, we show that unlike changes in input tari¤s, import competition
does not a¤ect the relative demand for managers.
JEL classications: F66, F14, M12
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rm organization
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Can input-trade liberalization increase the demand for managers? Imported inputs make an im-
portant source of technology inows, especially in developing economies which import signicant
portions of their equipment.1 These, in turn, may lead to changes in rmsproduction technologies,
requiring labor adjustments in terms of training, and problem solving. Previous research show that
access to cheaper and previously unavailable inputs have important implications for productivity
and output.2 This literature, however, overlooked the potential e¤ects of the imported inputs
on the demand for managing the new incoming knowledge. This may be especially prominent in
light of the recently emerging theoretical literature on the e¤ects of trade liberalization on rm
managerial practices, quality, and hierarchical structure,3 and its importance to productivity and
performance,4 including in developing economies.5 Examining whether imported inputs are asso-
ciated with managerial incentives may, thus, shed light on rst-order issues such as the impact of
trade policies on rmsgrowth and productivity.6 Adopting the case of India, this paper makes a
rst empirical attempt to ll this gap.
Using a rich data set of Indian manufacturing rms that uniquely distinguishes between the
compensations of managers and non-managers,7 we explore the impact of plausibly exogenous
changes in input tari¤s on the demand for managers relative to non-managers. The emphasis on
the relative demand of managers is central in our analysis. Imported-inputs-driven changes in the
production process, via the new incoming technologies, may a¤ect the demand for both managers
and non-managers. For instance, considering this along the lines of Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012) and Garicano (2000), rms that face a more complex production technology may upgrade the
skills of their production workers (non-managers), yet may otherwise economize on the problem
solving process by increasing the quality and number of specialist problem solvers (managers),
1These patterns are documented in various studies including Caselli and Wilson (2004), Eaton and Kortum (2001),
and Raveh and Reshef (2016). This was especially prominent during the 1990s, a period relevant to our study, during
which several developing economies imported the vast majority of their capital equipment. Importantly, these imports
were made from a small number of industrialized economies.
2See Amiti and Konings (2007), Bas (2012), Bas, Johansson, Murtin, and Nicoletti (2016), Bas and Strauss-Kahn
(2014), Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015), Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010), Halpern, Koren, and
Szeidl (2015), Kasahara and Lapham (2013), and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), among others.
3Models that present associations between trade liberalization and rm organization include Caliendo and Rossi-
Hansberg (2012), Ma (2015), Marin and Verdier (2003), Marin and Verdier (2008), and Marin and Verdier (2014).
4See e.g. Bloom, Brynjolfsson, Foster, Jarmin, Saporta-Eksten, and Van Reenen (2013). We discuss this literature
in more detail in a later sub-section.
5Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) point at the prominence of this in the case of India.
6See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016) on the need for analyses that examine the e¤ects of trade policies on rm and
individual outcomes.
7We dene managers as any workers who manage at least one other worker (or who is the sole worker in the rm),
with non-managers accounting for the remaining balance. We discuss this in further detail in the empirical part.
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depending on which option minimizes their costs. Hence, approaching this empirically requires
examining the complementarity (or substitutability) of imported inputs and managers relative to
that of imported inputs and non-managers.
We start by presenting the link between trade and the relative demand for managers in our
sample of Indian rms, for the period of 1990-2006. This is plotted in Figure 1.8 Both measures
have been increasing steadily throughout the period, exhibiting a correlation of 0:85. The surge in
trade is a consequence of the Indian 1990s trade reform which we discuss further below. The increase
in the compensation share of managers is what we aim to investigate.9 We seek to understand
whether there is indeed a systematic association between the two. Figure 2 points at a possible
direction. Dividing the relative demand measure to importing and non-importing rms indicates
that the surge is almost an exclusive feature of the former types. This intrigues undertaking a more
careful examination of the association between imports and the relative demand for managers.
To do so, we rst motivate the analysis via a simple analytical framework, along the lines of
Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994). This yields a reduced form equation that links between
imports and the relative demand for managers, which we follow in the empirical analysis. In
a preliminary examination, testing trade measures directly via conditional correlations, we nd
that consistent with Figure 2, it is only imports and more specically those of intermediate
inputsthat are positively associated with the relative demand for managers. This then refutes the
possibility of observing a simple administrative relabeling (an option we elaborate on later), and
paves the way to considering tari¤s in an attempt to provide causal inferences.
To establish a causal link, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment, Indias Eight-Plan trade
reform. The details of this reform, and its merits in the context of our case, are outlined separately
in the following section. The key point is that this reform provides plausibly exogenous changes in
industry-level input and output tari¤s, with ample cross-industry variation, which we use as the
basis of our identication strategy.10 We nd a remarkably persistent and economically meaningful
negative e¤ect that, consistent with the ndings in the initial analysis, is entirely driven by input
tari¤s. The relative dominance of input, over output, tari¤s suggests that this e¤ect is manifested
8The gure presents yearly average (over all rms), 1990-2006, of the share of total trade in gross value added and
the share of managerial compensation in total labor compensation. We proxy for the relative demand for managers
using the latter. We discuss both measures in more detail in the empirical part.
9Notably, the observed steep increase in managerial compensation over the given period is not a unique feature
of the Indian economy, and is also observed elsewhere. Data from S&P Capital IQs Compustat ExecuComp Data-
base indicates that the median annual compensation of CEOs of rms included in the S&P 500 Index grew from
approximately 3$ million in 1992 to almost 10$ million in 2006 (in 2011 prices), hence increasing by a factor of three.
10By which we, in e¤ect, follow the empirical methodology, and data sources of previous studies that examined
the e¤ects of this trade reform on the Indian economy, including Ahsan (2013), Ahsan and Mitra (2014), Bas
and Berthou (2017), De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016), Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and
Topalova (2010), Hasan, Mitra, Ranjan, and Ahsan (2012), and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011).
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via changes in the production side rather than through a product market (import) competition. In
terms of magnitude, our benchmark estimates indicate that a 10% decrease in input tari¤s increases
the relative demand for managers by approximately 1  1:5%. This e¤ect is robust to considering
various controls, specications, and estimation techniques. Specically, it is not an outcome of
industry-specic trends, such as for instance a delicensing reform (outlined in more detail later),
and is robust to potential associations between managers and: skill, capital intensity, productivity,
export tari¤s, and management technology.
Examining the separate components of the relative demand measure we nd that this e¤ect is
triggered by changes in managerscompensation, rather than by that of non-managers. This, in
turn, suggests that it is not an outcome of outsourcing or other schemes that may lead to major
layo¤s of non-managers, such as for instance systematic cross-industry di¤erences in rms exit
rates. Decomposing the managerscompensation into its wages and bonuses components, we nd
that both of them increase as a response to a decrease in input tari¤s. Similarly, the number of
executives increase, as well as the average (per-executive) wages and bonuses. These patterns are
driven primarily by the input-importing domestically owned rms that produce intermediate goods.
Additional tests indicate that these patterns are: (i) observed across the rmssize distribution;
(ii) applicable in both exporting and non-exporting rms; (iii) stronger in family-run rms that
operate under exible labor market regulations; (iv) relatively more dominant in the short-run.
The analysis ends with a discussion of results. We begin this discussion by summarizing the
main ndings, and highlighting their contribution to understanding some of the key questions
related to the impact of trade policies. Thereafter, we consider a conceptual framework that may
shed light on the potential underlying mechanisms at work. In particular, drawing on the results of
previous related theoretical and empirical research, we interpret the main ndings to be an outcome
of changes in rmsorganization of knowledge, triggered by the new technologies embedded in the
incoming inputs.
The paper contributes in addition to two strands of literature. First is the empirical litera-
ture on trade liberalization and rm organization, for which the contribution is threefold. First,
previous empirical studies that examined the trade-organization nexus were based on case studies
of developed economies.11 Through the case of India, this paper makes a rst attempt to study
aspects of this nexus in a developing economy, emphasizing its potential distinctive features in this
11Empirical evidence has been based on data from: Austria and Germany (Marin (2009), and Marin and Verdier
(2014)), France (Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2015)), Portugal (Fernandes, Ferreira, and Winters (2014)),
Norway and Sweden (Oxelheim and Randy (2005)), U.K. (Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, and Van Reenen (2007)), and
the U.S. (Carpenter and Sanders (1998), Cunat and Guadalupe (2009), Friedrich (2016), Guadalupe and Wulf (2010),
Ma (2015), Marin and Verdier (2008), and Keller and Olney (2017))  all of which belong to the group of highly
developed countries.
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context. This connects to the second point. Previous research emphasized the role of product mar-
ket competition in a¤ecting rm organization.12 Conversely, we show that in a developing economy,
where imported inputs play a central role in absorbing new technologies, input-trade liberalization
may be more prominent than import competition. Third, previous studies examined components
related primarily to the managerial side, such as wages and bonuses. Very little attention, however,
has been given to the inclusion of the non-managersside to consider relative terms and within-rm
inequality.13 Our analysis examines both concurrently, providing interpretations in both absolute
and relative terms.
Second is the literature on trade liberalization and the demand for skill in developing economies.
Neoclassical trade theory, via the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, predicts that trade liberalization in-
creases demand in the abundant factor, which is expected to translate to increased relative demand
for low-skill labor in developing economies. Several studies, however, document an increase in
the skill premium in some developing economies, especially during the 1980s and 1990s (Goldberg
and Pavcnik (2007)). Various explanations have been o¤ered, including trade-induced skill-biased
technical change (Acemoglu (2003), and Zeira (2007)), capital-skill complementarity (Burstein,
Cravino, and Vogel (2013), and Parro (2013)), credit constraints (Bonfatti and Ghatak (2013)),
import composition (Raveh and Reshef (2016)), improved exports (Zhu and Treer (2005)), and
quality upgrading (Verhoogen (2008)). We show that our main result is not an outcome of an
increase in the demand for skill; nonetheless, since our analysis focuses on relative terms, and
managers are included in the standard denition of the skilled group,14 this paper points at a new
potential contributing factor: imported inputs that increase the relative demand for managers.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the details of the rm-level data. Section
3 undertakes the main exercise, examining the e¤ects of input-trade liberalization on the relative
demand for managers. Section 4 concludes.
2 Firm-Level Data
We examine rms in the Indian manufacturing sector. The rm-level analysis is primarily based on
the PROWESS database, constructed by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE),
12Some examples include Cunat and Guadalupe (2009), Marin and Verdier (2008), Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen
(2016), and Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2010).
13Two exceptions are Friedrich (2016) and Ma (2015). The former examines the e¤ect of trade barriers on within-
rm wage inequality via changes in rm hierarchies, using a sample of Danish rms. The latter studies the impact
of globalization on executivesincome shares in U.S. rms. In contrast, we examine the e¤ects of input-trade liber-
alization on the compensation share of managers, within the context of a developing economy.
14Most of the said papers adopt a skill division of production and non-production workers, where the managers
group is included in the latter.
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an Indian government sponsored agency. We outline the features of this dataset in detail in this
section.
The PROWESS database contains annual-based information, covering the period 1990-2011, on
approximately 27,400 publicly listed companies, all within the organized sector, of which almost
11,500 are in the manufacturing sector.15 It reports direct measures on a vast array of rm-level
characteristics including sales, disaggregated trade components, R&D expenditures, technology
transfers, production factors employed, gross value added, assets, ownership, and others which we
outline further within the empirical analysis. In addition, it covers both large and small enterprises.
Data for the former types are collected from balance sheets, whereas those for the latter ones are
based on CMIEs periodic surveys of smaller companies.
PROWESS presents several features that make it particularly appealing for the purposes of our
study, and puts it in an advantage compared to other available sources, such as the Indian Annual
Survey of Industries (ASI), for instance. First, unlike other sources, the PROWESS data is in e¤ect
a panel of rms that enables us to study their behavior over time. Specically, the (unbalanced)
sample covers 8,000 rms, across 108 (4-digit NIC) manufacturing industries that belong to 22
(2-digit NIC) larger ones,16 over the period of 1990-2006.17 Importantly, it covers the 1990s trade
reform, being an essential part of our analysis that we discuss later.
Second, the unique feature of the data set, on which our study is mainly based, is that it
disaggregates compensation data to those received by managers and non-managers, with a further
disaggregation of compensation to wages and bonuses.18 Specically, the division relates to three
categories: non-managers, directors, and executives. The latter two comprise the managersgroup.
The denition of the former is that they do not manage other employees; conversely, directors
(executives) are dened as managers without (with) executive powers. Executives include, for
instance, the CEO, CFO, and Chairman, whereas Directors may cover positions such as Divisional
Managers. While there is scope for subjective interpretation of this distinction by rms, it does not
15While placed according to the 4-digit 2008 National Industrial Classication (NIC) level, rms are reclassied
to the 2004 level to facilitate matching with the industry-level tari¤s. Hence, all industry-level categorization made
throughout the paper are based on the 2004 NIC classication.
16 In terms of composition, approximately 20% of the rms in the dataset are registered under the Chemical and
Pharmaceutical industries, followed by Food Products and Beverages (13.74%), Textiles (10.99%) and Basic Metals
(10.46%).
17We limit the analysis to 2006, which in turn limits the number of rms covered, to avoid potential biases caused
by the 2008 nancial crisis. Nonetheless, we note that the main results are robust to extending the analysis to 2011.
18An additional source that provides similar data is the ExecuComp data set (used for instance in Cunat and
Guadalupe (2009), and Keller and Olney (2017)). While its coverage in terms of years and rms is largely similar
to that of PROWESS (ExecuComp covers around 3500 rms, over the years 1992-2015), it di¤ers from PROWESS
on a number of fronts. First, it pertains to a developed economy, the United States. Second, it does not provide
compensation data on non-managers, or non-executive managers. Third, it does not provide rm-level trade measures.
Last, its executive compensation data is richer in terms of its available components.
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a¤ect our main analysis which considers the aggregate of Executives and Directors. These features
enable us to study the demand for managers, relative to non-managers, and its potential sources,
over a relatively large period of time.
Importantly, the data set provides ample variation across rms and industries in the compen-
sation characteristics of managers compared to non-managers. For instance, in Figure 3 we plot
the average share of managerial compensation in total labor compensation across 2-digit industries
for the period of 1990-2006. Going from a low of approximately 0.5% to a high of around 3.5%,
the di¤erence across industries is clearly observed. This is also seen when measuring changes over
time. Averaging annual changes over the same period, we observe that while in some industries the
average annual rate of change is around 10%, in others it can get higher than 200%. This translates
to the rm level, where such variation is even more prominent.
One key related characteristic is that close to 25% of rms report having no managerial com-
pensation. These rms either have no managerial layer, or their managerial compensation is low.19
The former is consistent with the family-oriented Indian rm culture (Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan,
McKenzie, and Roberts (2013)). The data, however, support the potential prominence of the lat-
ter. To see this, in Table 1 we compare some of the key rm-level measures of rms that report
no managerial compensation to those that do. The key di¤erences are in size and technology.
Specically, rms that report having no managerial income produce signicantly less output, are
less capital intensive, and spend less on R&D. Conversely, family-owned rms are spread across the
rmssize distribution (Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013)).20
Last, PROWESS has a relatively wide coverage, accounting for more than 70% of the economic
activity in the organized industrial sector, and 75% (95%) of corporate (excise duty) taxes collected
by the Indian Government (Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010)). In terms of
trade, it covers approximately 30-35% of Indias total exports and imports activity, presenting a
reasonably good aggregate picture on Indias trade position. All variables are measured in Millions
of Indian Rupees (INR), deated to 2005 using the industry-specic Wholesale Price Index,21 and
are outlined in the Appendix. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables.22
19Notably, compensation values of less than 100,000 Indian Rupees are reported by PROWESS as zero.
20 In addition, an examination of family-owned rms conducted in a later sub-section provides further support.
As will be evident, it is rather the family-owned rms that yield the steepest increase in the compensation share of
managers, following input-trade liberalization.
21We thank Hunt Allcott for sharing this data, used in Allcott, Collard-Wexler, and OConnell (2016).
22One pattern described in Table 2 deserves further comment. As reported, maximum gures of various Gross
Value Added (GVA) normalized measures can reach relatively high values. This is a feature of the denition of GVA
(see Appendix), and occurs in cases of high purchases and low sales, such as in initial investments, for instance. All
results are robust to omitting observations with GVA-normalized gures higher than one; nonetheless, we maintain
the full sample in the main analyses for the purposes of exploiting its full extent.
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2.1 Data quality
The PROWESS database has been used in various previous similar studies on trade liberalization,23
providing some reassurance for its relevance and applicability to the particular issues studied, as
well as for its overall reliance. However, to the best of our knowledge we are the rst to study
its managerial compensation measures in this context. That said, we next discuss two quality-
related aspects of these measures: accuracy and consistency, as these may take a central role in the
empirical analysis.
Starting with accuracy, as mentioned CMIE retrieves most of the compensation data from
balance sheets, reported in publicly-available annual reports. To test the accuracy of our measures
of interest, we compare the data reported in PROWESS to those reported in the annual reports
for a random selection of rms, representing both relatively large and small ones, in the year 2011.
Results appear in the Appendix Tables 12 and 13. In the rst (Table 12), we compare
between the reported compensation of executives (Columns (1) and (2)) and directors (Columns
(3) and (4)). In both cases we observe a strong match between the compensation data reported
in PROWESS and those given in the annual reports, with correlations being higher than 0:99. In
the second (Table 13), we compare the number of reported executives in each of the sources, with
the correlation being 1. Albeit not covering all years, rms, or the entire range of variables, these
results provide some a¢ rmation for the accuracy and reliability of the measures used.
Moving to consistency, the analysis implicitly assumes that there is consistency in the denition
of managers across rms. However, the said family-oriented nature of Indian rms, and the surveys
CMIE uses for smaller rms, may give rise to some subjectivity in that respect. This deserves some
comment. First, we note that all rms included in the analysis are listed in the Mumbai Stock
Exchange, and hence are subject to the same corporate governance regulations, including the said
denitions. This provides a more homogenous, and regulated, environment that mitigates the given
concern. Second, as will be evident we show that the main patterns are observed across the rms
size distribution, with constant magnitudes across size-groups, indicating that the main results hold
irrespective of rm size. This further mitigates concerns related to sensitivities to CMIEs source
and to potential subjectivities.
23See e.g. Ahsan (2013), Ahsan and Mitra (2014), De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016), Gold-
berg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010), and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011).
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3 Input-trade Liberalization and the Demand for Managers
We examine the association between input-trade liberalization and the relative demand for man-
agers, using the rm-level data described above. This is done in various steps. First, we present
an analytical framework that establishes a reduced form equation that links the two key measures.
Second, motivated by the latter, we undertake a preliminary analysis that examines trade measures
directly. Third, based on the results of this initial analysis we then investigate the link between
changes in input tari¤s and the relative demand for managers, to provide a causal interpretation.
Last, we summarize the main ndings, discuss their merits, and consider possible triggering factors.
3.1 Analytical framework
Let us lay out a simple analytical framework to help organize the discussion. Our main focus is on
trade liberalization vis-à-vis changes in tari¤s. Realizing, however, that by denition tari¤s a¤ect
imports directly, and for tractability purposes, we link the latter directly to imports within our
setting.24 We follow the framework set by Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), applied to our
case.25
Suppose a representative rm, within a given industry of a developing economy,26 uses three
inputs: managers (m), non-managers (n), and imports (M).27 Imports are regarded as inputs
because the vast majority of equipment, within the type of economy and period we investigate, is
imported (Eaton and Kortum (2001)). The price of imports is determined in international markets,
taken as given by local rms. M is, therefore, assumed to be a quasi-xed factor. Conversely, m
and n are variable inputs. Firms operate in a competitive industry, where factor prices are set
accordingly, and production exhibits constant returns to scale. Cost minimization then yields the
following relationship:











The compensation share of managers in total labor compensation (wmmc ), S, is a¤ected by the
managers to non-managers wage ratio, and the output share of imports. Details on the derivations
24This follows Cunat and Guadalupe (2009) and Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), for instance, who also maintain a
focus on import penetration for investigating related issues.
25Other recent studies that adopt this framework for questions related to skill-heterogeneity include Larrain (2015),
Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen (2014), and Raveh and Reshef (2016).
26This links to the empirical part, where albeit examining rm-level data where possible, we primarily take a
cross-industry perspective.
27The inclusion of three inputs is a simplication. Adding further inputs, or otherwise further disaggregating the
ones included, would not change the basic outcome; rather, it would result in having further independent components
in the reduced form outcome. We account for that in the empirical analysis, as we include a multitude of controls,
including some that are a disaggregation of the core inputs included.
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are in Appendix D.
We follow Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) and assume that the quality-adjusted price
ratio of managers to non-managers does not vary across industries. In such a case it only a¤ects
the constant term in case it is dropped, which will be done due to data limitations. Nonetheless,
as in Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen (2014) we shall add year by industry xed e¤ects that
absorb the relative wage term in case the above assumption is relaxed. We are therefore left with
the following outcome:






Relaxing the assumption of constant returns to scale in technology, as is done in the empirical
analysis, requires controlling for output, yielding the following:





+  ln(y): (3)
This empirically testable association links between the output share of imports, and the share of
managerscompensation in total labor compensation, regarded as the relative demand for managers.
To comment on its interpretation, suppose that M brings in new technologies that may a¤ect
the demand for the other inputs. For instance, as motivated initially, non-managers may receive
further training to work with the new technologies, upgrading their skills, whereas managers may
increase their span of control in an attempt to economize on the problem solving process that
involves adjusting to new technologies. Equation (3) enables testing the relative complementarity
(or substitutability) of M to either of the inputs. Specically, a positive  indicates that M is
relatively more complementary to managers, increasing their relative demand. Next, we test this
hypothesis using the rm-level data.
3.2 Preliminary analysis: Trade measures
We start by estimating the empirical counterpart of Equation (3). While the analytical framework
focused on imports, in this preliminary analysis we examine both import and export penetration
for completeness, and to better motivate the focus on the former. Hence, we consider the following
managerscompensation share equation, for rm i, in industry j, at time t:
Mcomp
Tcomp i;t
= +  ln(
T
GV A
)i;t + Xi;t + i + j  t + i;t; (4)
where Mcomp is the managerstotal compensation, Tcomp is total labor compensation, T is total
imports or exports, GV A is gross value added, X is a vector of controls that we specify below, and
, ,  are rm, industry, and time xed e¤ects, respectively. In e¤ect, this model examines the
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determinants of the relative demand for managers. Specically, we are interested in understanding
the characteristics of ; namely, the empirical association between normalized imports, or exports,
and the relative demand for managers.
Our benchmark setting includes several points. First, as mentioned we examine an annual-
based, unbalanced panel over the period of 1990-2006. Second, standard errors are clustered at the
rm-level in all cases. Third, on top of the separate xed e¤ects terms, i and t, the specication
also includes the interactions of j and t. These interaction terms control for various within-year
industry trends, such as the industry-year specic delicensing or FDI-liberalization phenomena,28
the managers to non-managers wage ratios (in case the assumption that they lack inter-industry
variation is relaxed), or various industry-specic labor laws and federal subsidy initiatives.
Fourth, motivated by insights from Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, and Van Reenen (2007) and
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) the vector X includes the following controls (henceforth, rm
controls):29 the age, R&D intensity, assets, and output of a rm. Realizing that older rms might
have a more established structure and culture, the rst measure controls for potential di¤erences
in the exibility of undertaking organizational reforms. Addressing potentially related U-shaped
e¤ects, we also include the square term of age. The second variable, measured as the share of
R&D expenditure and royalty payments for technical knowhow in GVA, captures di¤erences in
technological orientation, which is essential for considering the organizational e¤ects of technological
ows. The third variable controls for rm size, given that larger rms may have greater management
needs. The last variable controls for rmsoutput, following the analytical framework and Equation
(3). Later we discuss separately further controls and potential channels.
We begin by closely following Equation (3), estimating a version of Equation (4) where the
relevant independent variables are in their natural logarithm form. Specically, these include the
normalized trade-related measures. Since, however, some rms do not import or export, these were
increased by one prior to conversion, to be able to exploit the sample to its fullest. For consistency
we repeat this modication for all logarithmic conversions done throughout the analysis.30
Results appear in Table 3. Starting with imports, denoted by T in Equation (4), Column
(1) presents the benchmark setting. As can be seen, our coe¢ cient of interest is positive and
28Until the 1980s large rms were required to obtain an operating license, and FDI was capped at 40% in most in-
dustries. Starting in 1985, and continuing in the 1990s, industries went through both a delicensing reform, where the
abovementioned requirement was dropped, and a FDI-liberalization process (see e.g. Nataraj (2011)). Chamarbag-
wala and Sharma (2011) note that the delicensing process helped to upgrade rmsskill intensity, emphasizing further
the relevance of controlling for this in our context.
29Nonetheless, we note that all results are robust to its exclusion.
30We note that all results hold, both qualitatively and quantitatively, without this manual addition in any of the
logarithmic variables used in the estimations. We prefer it as the alternative would result in testing smaller samples
and raising further sample-selection related concerns.
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signicant. Imports and the relative demand for managers are positively related. In addition, the
magnitude is economically meaningful: a 1% increase in the GVA share of total imports increases
the compensation share of managers by approximately 0:1%.
An initial implication of these observations, together with the patterns outlined in Figure 2,
is that this refutes the possibility that a simple administrative reclassication of workers is driving
the increasing trend observed on our outcome variable in Figure 1. This applies assuming that
such reclassication is not a specic feature of importing rms, and because the abovementioned
delicensing process is controlled for.
Turning to exports, Column (2) replicates Column (1) with T denoting exports. As can be seen,
unlike imports this case yields statistically insignicant results with lower magnitudes. To better
observe the distinction between the two, in Column (3) we again follow the same specication of
Column (1) yet we include both imports and exports concurrently. The results clearly point at
imports as being the triggering factor. Next, we examine which types of imports drive this.
3.2.1 Disaggregating imports: The role of imported inputs
Following the above, we dig deeper into the e¤ects of imports and disaggregate them to various
groups, to investigate their separate e¤ects on the relative demand for managers. All estimations
follow the benchmark specication of Column (1), with the respective import type in lieu of T , as
specied.
The data enable us to disaggregate imports to four sub-groups: raw materials, capital goods,
stores and spares, and nished goods. The aggregation of the rst two represents the group of
intermediate inputs, with the other two being non-inputs. In Column (4) we estimate Equation (4)
for imports of inputs and non-inputs, together with exports. The positive and signicant result on
inputs, together with the near-zero and non-signicant result on non-inputs and exports, indicate
that it is specically imported inputs that are associated with increases in the compensation share
of managers. Following exercises, focusing on input tari¤s, will reveal this association is highly
persistent and robust.
Which inputs are dominant? To address that, we estimate in Column (5) a specication that
includes the four sub-groups together, in addition to exports. The pattern observed is clear. The
overall e¤ect outlined previously is driven in its entirely by imports of capital goods, given its pre-
cisely estimated positive , in contrast to those of the other types, including exports, which appear
imprecise and with smaller magnitudes. As capital goods is the relatively technological-intensive
sub-group of intermediate inputs, this is consistent with the initial hypothesis that intermediate
inputs may increase the relative demand for managers via an increase in demand for managing
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the new incoming technology. Interestingly, these patterns are consistent with Bloom, Garicano,
Sadun, and Van Reenen (2014) who nd that ICT capital increases managersspan of control.31
3.3 Main analysis: Changes in tari¤s
To this point our analysis revolved around trade measures, motivating a focus on imported inputs.
Next, we turn the focus to trade liberalization directly. Motivated by the initial trade-related
results, we examine changes in tari¤s a major liberalization tool with an emphasis on those
related to intermediate inputs. In addition, this enables addressing various econometric issues that
may have plagued the initial analysis, the most notable one being the potential endogeneity of
imports to the relative demand for managers. We address this concern, among others, in this sub-
section. To do so, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment: The 1990s trade reform in India. We
describe it next.
3.3.1 Indias trade reform: A quasi-natural experiment
Prior to 1990 India was one of the most trade-restrictive economies in Asia, having high tari¤ and
non-tari¤ barriers. In 1991, India turned to the IMF, following a balance-of-payments crisis, for
assistance. The latter conditioned such assistance on an implementation of a major adjustment
program that was to include also liberalization steps that would abandon the restrictive trade
policies. As a result, average tari¤s fell by more than half between 1990 and 1996 (Topalova and
Khandelwal (2011)). Non-tari¤ barriers made a similar drop between the late 1980s and the mid-
1990s (Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010)). More specically, starting at around
150 in 1990, the average tari¤ level dropped to approximately tenth of that by 2006. These major
tari¤ changes form the key policy measure we exploit.
This trade reform presents several advantages that make it appealing for the purposes of this
study. First, the crisis that led to the adjustment program was triggered by external events, such as
the sudden increases in oil prices, drop in remittances from Indian workers abroad, and major polit-
ical occurrences (the murder of Rajiv Gandhi, for instance) that damaged foreign investment. This,
in turn, in conjunction with the fact that reforms were passed quickly, led to sudden changes that
were unanticipated by Indian rms, establishing the reform as being a quasi-natural experiment.
Second, the liberalization reform did not seem to have targeted industries within the manufac-
turing sector in a way that was related to pre-reform conditions. Indeed, Topalova and Khandelwal
31To the extent that higher demand for managers is associated with better management practices, these patterns
are also consistent with those documented by Bloom, Manova, Sun, Van Reenen, and Yu (2016). They nd that
better managed rms in China and the US use more imported inputs, and specically, more expensive and higher
quality inputs.
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(2011) show that changes in industry-level tari¤s during the years 1991-1997 were not correlated
with pre-reform industry characteristics. In the empirical analysis we follow this nding by restrict-
ing the causal analysis to the same period; we discuss this further in the estimations. In addition,
we verify in the Appendix that changes in the industry-level tari¤s were not associated with past
industry-level measures of managerial compensation.32 Importantly, this further establishes the
plausibly exogenous nature of the reform and the shocks we study.
Third, there is much variation in the tari¤ changes across industries. While being reported in
previous studies (e.g. Topalova and Khandelwal (2011)), this feature is also observed in our sample.
The 4-digit industry-level average annual decreases in tari¤s range from as low as 2% to as high
as 25%, with a mean of 6% and a standard deviation of approximately 2.5%. Last, the usage of
this quasi-natural experiment as a tool to identify the e¤ects of trade liberalization on rm-level
behavior has been done in several previous studies,33 thus establishing its familiarity and reliability.
We exploit this feature next, as we outline our empirical strategy.
3.3.2 Tari¤ data and empirical strategy
We complement the rm-level data with tari¤ rates. Tari¤ data are derived from the TRAINS-
WITS tari¤ database, at the HS 6-digit level. We pass these output tari¤s through Indias input-







where  outputk;t is the tari¤ on industry k at time t, and ak;j is the share of industry k in the value
of industry j.34 We concord both the input and output tari¤s to the 4-digit 2004 NIC level using
the Debroy and Santhanam (1993) concordance table.35 The tari¤s are then matched with our
rm-level data.
Hence, consistent with our analytical framework, which takes a within-industry perspective,
and similar to Ahsan (2013) and Ahsan and Mitra (2014), we investigate industry-level tari¤s.
32This is discussed in Appendix E, with the results presented in Appendix Tables 14 and 15.
33See e.g. Ahsan (2013), Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010), and Topalova and Khandelwal
(2011).
34 In e¤ect, we follow the methodology used in De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016). Fixing the
input-output weights at 1993-1994 addresses related potential endogeneity concerns. Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik,
and Topalova (2010) report that this input-output table likely reects Indias production technology across industries
at the start of the reform period. Nonetheless, we show in a later sub-section that the main results are robust to
setting the initial year of the sample to 1993.
35The concordance methodology employs the Debroy and Santhanam (1993) schedule to calculate (simple) average
industry-level tari¤s. This follows the methodology of previous studies that examined the e¤ects of changes in (input
and output) tari¤s in Indian industries (e.g. De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016), Goldberg,
Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010), and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011)). As outlined in Topalova (2010),
this methodology provides a relatively precise measure of industry-level tari¤s in India. Similarly, this concordance
procedure is undertaken in all cases that report using the Debroy and Santhanam (1993) schedule throughout the
analysis.
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The empirical strategy builds upon the exogeneity feature discussed above to undertake the main
analysis using OLS. Realizing tari¤ changes may have a lagging e¤ect, and to better address further
endogeneity concerns we consider liberalization shocks in the previous period (albeit experimenting
with di¤erent lags later in the analysis). In e¤ect, we follow the empirical strategy of previous
studies that investigated the e¤ects of trade liberalization using the same reform (e.g. Topalova
and Khandelwal (2011)).
3.3.3 Input tari¤s: Causal Inference
We estimate the tari¤-based version of Equation (4), for rm i, in industry j, at time t using the
following reduced form equation:
Mcomp
Tcomp i;t
= +  ln(InpTar)j;t 1 + Xi;t 1 + i + t + (Ind  Trend)j + i;t; (5)
where InpTar refers to input tari¤. The remaining notation follows that described previously. The
specication is similar to that of Equation (4) with the industry by year xed e¤ects excluded due
to their absorption of the industry-level tari¤s. Instead, we include industry-specic time trends. In
addition, X enters the model in t  1, to further mitigate related endogeneity concerns. We follow
Ahsan and Mitra (2014) and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and cluster the standard errors at
the industry-level.36 Guided by the results of the preliminary analysis, which point at imported
inputs as the triggering factor, our main focus is on input tari¤s. We nonetheless consider the case
of output tari¤s, yet relegate their analysis to the Appendix.
Our focus is on the coe¢ cient . Results appear in Table 4. Column (1) presents the bench-
mark case. Consistent with the preliminary analysis,  is precisely estimated and negative, indi-
cating that input-trade liberalization increases the relative demand for managers. Interpreting the
magnitude, a 10% reduction in input tari¤s induces an increase of 1% in the compensation share
of managers. Column (2), which estimates a dynamic version of Equation (5), provides a similar
result. Considering the previously discussed nding of Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) on the ex-
ogeneity of tari¤ changes to industry characteristics during the 1990s, in Columns (3)-(4) we follow
the estimations of Columns (1)-(2) under the restricted sample period of 1990-1997. The results
are qualitatively similar to those obtained under the initial cases, yet are quantitatively stronger.
To observe the source of the change in the relative demand for managers more clearly, we
disaggregate the ratio to its two main components, managersand non-managerscompensation,
and test the GVA share of each separately as the dependent variable. Results appear in Columns
36Nonetheless, we note that results are maintained, with high stability, when otherwise clustering the standard
errors at the rm level.
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(5) and (6). The distinction, observed via the estimated s, is clear. Decreases in input tari¤s
increases managerscompensation, yet do not a¤ect that of non-managers. This indicates that the
relative demand for managers increases because of an increase in managerscompensation rather
than due to a decrease or a relatively smaller increase in the compensation of non-managers. This,
in turn, suggests that the main e¤ect is not driven by outsourcing of non-managerial tasks or other
specic schemes that may bring major layo¤s on the non-managersside.37
Last, although the primary focus is on input tari¤s we present an equivalent analysis using
output tari¤s in the Appendix Table 16. Notably, the e¤ect of output tari¤s on the relative
demand for managers is similar to that of input tari¤s, when examined independently. However,
when both input and output tari¤s are included concurrently, as in Columns (3) and (4), the
coe¢ cient on output tari¤s drops to approximately 0 and loses its preciseness whereas that on
input tari¤s remains stable in magnitude and signicance as in the benchmark cases. This suggests
that the e¤ect observed on output tari¤s works through the input side, contributing to the latters
relative dominance, and strengthening the initial observation on the triggering e¤ect of imported
intermediate inputs.
Importantly, this also provides some insights on the potential underlying mechanism. While
a decrease in output tari¤s may sti¤en product market (import) competition (Amiti and Konings
(2007)), a decrease in input tari¤s increases the technological complexity of the production process.
The latter is a feature of the higher quality and variety of imported inputs (Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001), Eaton and Kortum (1996), and Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010)).
The dominating e¤ect of input tari¤s suggests that the observed increase in the relative demand
of managers is triggered by changes in the production technologies rather than by a stronger
competition in the nal goods market.
To observe more clearly that import competition is weakly associated with changes in the relative
demand for managers, we test an additional, standard import competition measure: the industry-
level share of Chinese-sourced imports in total (Indian) imports.38 Import data are derived from the
UN-COMTRADE database at the HS 6-digit level and converted to the 4-digit 2004 NIC level using
the Debroy and Santhanam (1993) concordance table. Results with this measure are presented in
Columns (5)-(8) of Appendix Table 16, which follow the same specications as Columns (1)-(4)
only with this measure in lieu of output tari¤s. The estimated coe¢ cients on input tari¤s in all
cases is similar to those estimated in Columns (1)-(4), further indicating that the e¤ect we observe
37These include, for instance, potential e¤ects of input-trade liberalization on rmsexit rates, as well as mergers
and acquisitions, which if were applicable would have a¤ected the non-managers side.
38See e.g. Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price (2016), and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) who adopt a
similar proxy for the U.S. case.
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works through changes in the production side.
3.3.4 Components of the relative demand for managers
The benchmark analysis illustrated that input tari¤s increase the relative demand for managers
via increases in managerial compensation. In this sub-section we examine the components of the
latter, to better understand the sources of the change. We begin with disaggregating managers
compensation to its smaller ingredients, exploiting the full extent of available data on this. All
specications follow the benchmark one as in Column (1) of Table 4, with the dependent variable
changing between cases. Results appear in Table 5.
Hence, we disaggregate managers compensation to its two main components: wages and
bonuses.39 The former is the pre-determined salary received by the employees, whereas the latter
is incentive-based, often being linked to performance. Each is examined in Columns (1) and (2),
respectively, using relative terms, similar to our benchmark dependent variable in Equation (5).
This means using Managersj=(Managersj + Non   Managersj), where j 2 (wage; bonus), as
the dependent variable in each of the cases. Notably,  in both cases is negative and statistically
signicant. This indicates that input-trade liberalization increases both relative wages and relative
bonuses of managers,40 which when combined make a relative increase in managerscompensation.
Following an examination of the compensation components, we next look into the number of
managers. If input-trade liberalization changes the number of managers, the compensation share
can change even without changes in wages, making this distinct, yet complementary, to the previous
exercise. Hence, we exploit a feature in the rm-level data that lists the executives (by name)
for more than half of our rm-year observations to count their number.41 We make two initial
observations with this measure. First, the average number of executives in Indian rms has been
steadily increasing over our sample period; this is plotted in Figure 4, where we see that it is
close to 0 in 1990, and is increasing continuously up to almost 0.6 in 2006. Second, when dividing
the sample to importing and non-importing rms, we once again note that the average increase
observed over the entire sample is driven almost entirely by the importing rms; this is plotted in
Figure 5. To test this, in Column (3) of Table 5 we estimate our benchmark specication using
the number of executives as the outcome variable. The precisely estimated negative  conrms
39Note that this disaggregation is not available for all rm-years, decreasing the sample size by almost one half.
40 Interestingly, these results are consistent with those reported by Cunat and Guadalupe (2009), who found that
import penetration increases the sensitivity of pay-to-performance of US executives, hence indicating that these
patterns are not conned to developed economies.
41The data set also lists the directors (by name) yet only for approximately 10% of the sampled rms (note that
this is separate from reporting compensation data at this level, which has better coverage). We do note that the
patterns presented hold as well when middle management is included, yet due to the signicant drop in sample size
we focus strictly on the case of executives.
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that input-trade liberalization increases the number of executives.
Realizing that a decrease in input tari¤s increases both the compensation and number of man-
agers, we next examine the change in the average (per-executive) compensation components. In
Columns (4)-(5) of Table 5 we follow the benchmark specication using the average executive
wage and bonus as the outcome variables, respectively. The estimated s indicate that both of the
per-executive compensation measures increase following a drop in input tari¤s. These estimates,
together with the previous results, suggest that the observed increase in managerial compensation
is an outcome of a joint increase in their number as well as in their average wages and bonuses.
3.3.5 Firm characteristics
In this sub-section we look into various rm characteristics, in an attempt to identify the type of
rms that drive the main result. To do so, we estimate the following variation of Equation (5):
Mcomp
Tcomp i;t
= +  ln(InpTar  C)i;t 1 +  ln(InpTar D)i;t 1
+ Xi;t 1 + i + t + (Ind  Trend)j + i;t; (6)
where C is a dummy variable that captures one of four characteristics we outline below, and D is
a dummy variable that captures the remaining rm-year observations. Note that since the average
e¤ect (InpTar) is excluded, C and D can be estimated concurrently. In this case, therefore, 
and  provide the relative portion of each in the total, average e¤ect. The remaining notation and
estimation details follow those of Equation (5). Results in this sub-section appear in Table 6.
We start with rm size. Although we control for it, we seek to realize whether the main
e¤ect di¤erentiates across the rms size distribution. Considering GVA as a proxy for size, C
(D) captures above (below) median rm-year observations of GVA. Results appear in Column (1),
indicating that the main e¤ect is apparent in both groups, and in equal magnitude. To better
illustrate this, in the Appendix Figure A1 we plot a version of Figure 2 for four GVA-based
size-quartiles. The post-1995 hike in the compensation share of managers in the importing rms is
equivalently apparent in all four cases.
Second, we look into export orientation. The initial analysis indicated that the e¤ect is restricted
to importing rms; however, following related insights of Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) and
Mion and Opromolla (2014) on exporting rms, we examine whether the export decision of input
importing rms may a¤ect the patterns observed. Hence, in this case C (D) represents the rm-
year observations in which exports are positive (zero). The results, in Column (2), show that the
main e¤ect applies in equal magnitudes to both groups. Firms that import inputs increase their
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managerial compensation irrespective of their export orientation.42
Third, we examine rms end use. We follow Nouroz (2001) and use the input-output clas-
sications to categorize rms by the end use of their products. The division is thus made into
two groups: intermediate and nal goods. The former (latter) includes rms for which the end
use of their products are classied as intermediates, basic, or capital (consumer durables and non-
durables), and is captured via C (D). Results appear in Column (3). We see that the main result
is a feature of rms that belong to the intermediate goods group.
Last, we examine rm ownership. The data divides rm ownership to two main categories,
domestic and foreign owned. In this case C (D) captures the former (latter). Results appear
in Column (4). Our coe¢ cients of interest indicate that the main result is entirely driven by
domestically owned rms. This result implies that the change in managerial demand is not a feature
of foreign organizational culture inows from abroad. Put together with the previous results, the
subset of rms that drive the main result are those domestically owned rms that import inputs
to produce intermediate goods.
3.3.6 Family rms
This sub-section examines the role of family rms. The selection pool and preferences of family
managers di¤er from those of professional ones (Bandiera, Lemos, Prat, and Sadun (2017)), which
may yield di¤erent reactions to changes in trade policies. Realizing that family rms take a central
role in the Indian economy (Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013)), examining
their reaction may be pivotal to understanding the observed patterns of managerial compensation.
To do so, we estimate the following version of Equation (5):
Mcomp
Tcomp i;t
= +  ln(InpTar)j;t 1 + Fi +  ln(InpTar  F )i;t 1
+ Xi;t 1 + i + t + (Ind  Trend)j + i;t: (7)
The di¤erence from Equation (5) lies in F , an indicator for family rms, and its interaction
with the input tari¤s. We identify family rms by following the approach of the Securities and
Exchange Board of India (SEBI). SEBI denes a family rm to be one that is at least partly owned
by Hindu undivided families.43 Based on this, we construct four versions of F : i) a binary indicator
42The analysis in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) indicates that trade liberalization may increase management
layers in exporting rms. They consider a demand shock (bilateral trade liberalization) that may a¤ect exporting
rms more strongly. Conversely, we consider a demand shock (input-trade liberalization) that a¤ects input-dependent
rms, rather than those that export.
43According to Hindu law, a Hindu undivided family is one that consists of all persons lineally descendent from a
common ancestor.
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that takes the value of 1 for rms with positive equity share of Hindu undivided families; ii) the
equity share of Hindu undivided families; iii) a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 for rms
in which Hindu undivided families have an equity share higher than 30%; iv) a binary indicator
that is similar to the one described in (iii), only with a cut-o¤ of 50%. In e¤ect, the rst indicator
follows SEBIs denition of a family rm. Interestingly, it indicates that about 67% of the rms in
our sample are considered family rms,44 supporting the prominence of the Indian family-oriented
rm culture.45 The second measure indicates that the ownership share of Hindu undivided families
has a mean of 8%, and ranges from 0% to about 94%, as outlined in Table 2. The third and fourth
measures consider stricter denitions, under which a rm is considered family-owned if the equity
share of Hindu undivided families is substantial.
Importantly, rms started disclosing ownership information to SEBI in 2007. In an attempt to
mitigate potential measurement errors, we compute the average equity share of Hindu undivided
families over the period 2007-2009, and use that to create a cross-sectional division of rms, under
the assumption that rms that reported being family owned in 2007-2009 were also such during our
sample period (1990-2006). This assumption is based primarily on the denition of Hindu undivided
families, which takes a cross-generational perspective, especially in cases of substantial equity share.
This is supported by the ndings of Patnaik (2014) that indicate that family ownership patterns
in publicly-listed Indian rms have little variation during parts of our sample period.
Under these conditions F variates solely across rms. Hence, albeit being included in Equation
(7), it is in fact absorbed by ; our focus is, therefore, on the heterogeneous e¤ect, . Results appear
in Table 7. In each of the Columns (1)-(4) F represents each of its four versions, respectively. In
all cases  is negative, statistically signicant, and has a signicantly larger magnitude than that
of the baseline average e¤ect. Interestingly, the magnitude of  increases with the equity share of
Hindu undivided families. These patterns suggest that input-trade liberalization a¤ects the relative
demand for managers primarily in family-owned rms. Notably, this is consistent with ndings of
related studies on labor market adjustments to trade shocks, in both high and low income countries
(Chen and Steinwender (2017), McCaig and Pavcnik (2014), McCaig and Pavcnik (2015)).
To better observe that this is specic to family rms, in the Appendix we consider the role of two
additional standard (time-varying) measures of governance structure: the number of independent
44Nonetheless, this indicator does not cover all the rms with family ownership. For instance, some rms do not
report ownership of undivided families, yet they may still be family-owned rms via pyramid structures of ownership.
Patnaik (2014) considers these limitations and concludes that SEBIs denition captures the vast majority of family
rms in PROWESS.
45Notably, Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) have 100% family ownership in their sample
of Indian textile plants, and Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) indicate that 75% of rms in their sample of Indian
manufacturing plants are family owned. Nonetheless, we focus on publicly listed rms in which there is a higher
share of non-family rms compared to the set of private rms.
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directors, and the size of the board of directors.46 As discussed in the Appendix, this analysis
indicates that input-trade liberalization does not lead to changes in these governance measures,
and does not yield heterogeneous e¤ects on managerscompensation across di¤erent levels of these
measures.
3.3.7 Labor market regulations and rm location
Labor market institutions may shape managerial incentives. For instance, Bloom and Van Reenen
(2010) nd that heavily regulated labor markets are associated with poor management practices.
This may be important in the Indian context, in which labor markets are considered relatively
rigid (Topalova (2010)). In this sub-section we examine the impact of labor market regulations
on the association between input-trade liberalization and the demand for managers. We do so by
exploiting cross-state variation in labor institutions, interacted with rmsstate-locations.
A key di¤erence in labor market institutions across Indian states is based on state-amendments
made to the federal Industrial Disputes Act. Besley and Burgess (2004) examine all the 113
amendments made by state governments between 1958 and 1992 and code them as pro-employee,
pro-employer, or neutral. We employ an update of this index, constructed by Aghion, Burgess,
Redding, and Zilibotti (2008).47 This indicator records a value between -2 and 4 for each state,
with the former (latter) representing inexible, pro-employer (exible, pro-employee) labor market
regulations. In light of potential endogeneity concerns, we examine cross-state di¤erences in 1990.
Notably, there were only marginal changes in state labor institutions between the start and end of
our sample period, as noted in Chaurey (2015).
We then interact this index with rms state-locations, coded via their reported postcodes.
CMIE reports rmspostcodes based on their current location;48 consequently, we consider rms
state-locations in 2011. The applicability of this cross-sectional division is based on the observation
that cross-state factor mobility in India is considerably low, as noted by Topalova (2010) and
Siddharth (2008). Importantly, Topalova (2010) shows that labor remained immobile following the
trade reform we investigate.
46This is presented in Appendix F, with the results presented in Appendix Table 17.
47This index is not available for the following states: Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, and Nagaland.
This restricts the sample size.
48 In e¤ect, rms report their postcodes annually, yet in case of a change in the postcode CMIE over-writes the new
location, without keeping track of previous ones.
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Hence, we estimate variates of the following model:
Mcomp
Tcomp i;t
= +  ln(InpTar)j;t 1 + Labori +  ln(InpTar  Labor)i;t 1
+ Xi;t 1 + i + t + (Ind  Trend)j + i;t; (8)
where Labor represents the labor market regulations index described above, interacted with the
rms state-location. Notice that its average e¤ect is absorbed by , given that it has no time
variation. Results appear inTable 8. Column (1) follows the specied model; Column (2) estimates
a dynamic version of it. In both cases,  remains negative and signicant, with a stable magnitude.
The main result is, thus, robust to this inclusion. Interestingly, both cases yield a positive and
signicant . Input-trade liberalization a¤ects the compensation share of managers more strongly
in rms that are located in states with more exible, pro-employee labor market regulations.
To test the robustness of this, in the Appendix we undertake a similar analysis using a di¤erent
cross-sectional index, derived from Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar (2009).49 As outlined in the Appen-
dix, this analysis yields similar patterns. In addition, in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 we take
a more general approach and estimate Equation (5), and its dynamic version, with state by year
xed e¤ects. The latter control for time-varying cross-state di¤erences in labor market regulations,
as well as other institutional di¤erences. Both cases indicate that the main result remains to hold
under this addition.
3.3.8 Short vs. long term e¤ects
Our analysis focuses primarily on 1-year lag, short-run e¤ects of input-trade liberalization on man-
agerial compensation. This suggests that the observed impact may be an outcome of changes that
occur within relatively short timeframes, such as for instance updates in management practices.
Nonetheless, input tari¤s may also a¤ect the compensation of managers via changes that are ex-
pected to occur over longer timeframes, such as general equilibrium adjustments of prices, outputs,
or even the supply of managers.
To examine the role of time dynamics we estimate the following model:
Mcomp
Tcomp i;t
= +  ln(InpTar)j;t n + Xi;t 1 + i + t + (Ind  Trend)j + i;t; (9)
where n 2 [0; 3]. This specication is equivalent to Equation (5) with the di¤erence of considering
the impact of input tari¤s at di¤erent periods, ranging from its contemporaneous level (n = 0), to
its measure in t 3 (n = 3). Our focus is on , yet given that under these specications the sample
49This is discussed in Appendix G, with the results presented in Appendix Table 18.
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is more restricted, we put greater emphasis on interpreting magnitudes, rather than preciseness.
Results appear in Table 9. Columns (1)-(3) test the cases of 0, 2, and 3-year lag in input
tari¤s, respectively.50 In all cases the sign of  is similar to the one estimated in the 1-year lag
specication. However, the estimated magnitudes suggest that any potential contemporaneous and
2-year lag e¤ects are relatively weaker. Conversely, the e¤ects of changes in input tari¤s in t   3
appear to be largely equivalent to those observed in the baseline, 1-year lag case.
To put this to further test we estimate variates of the following, more demanding specication:
Mcomp
Tcomp i;t
= +  ln(InpTar)j;t +  ln(InpTar)j;t 1 + # ln(InpTar)j;t 2+
 ln(InpTar)j;t 3 + Xi;t 1 + i + t + (Ind  Trend)j + i;t; (10)
in which the di¤erent lags (0 up to 3) of input tari¤s are concurrently included. Column (4) follows
this specication; Column (5) estimates its dynamic version. In both cases we see that input tari¤s
a¤ect the share of managerial compensation when it is in either its 1-year or 3-year lag versions.
This suggests that both short and long term changes are applicable to some extent, yet the former
is more dominant given that the 1-year lag e¤ect appears relatively stronger and more robust.
3.3.9 Additional controls
Having identied the main e¤ect, we next consider further controls and potential intermediate




= +  ln(InpTar)j;t 1 + Zj;t 1 +  ln(InpTar  Z)j;t 1
+ Xi;t 1 + i + t + (Ind  Trend)j + i;t: (11)
Notation is similar to that described in Equation (5), with the addition of Z which represents
one of ve additional controls: skill, capital intensity, productivity, export tari¤s, and management
technology. Z enters together with its interaction with InpTar, at t   1.52 In each case we focus
on two points. First, we consider the role of the additional control as an intermediate channel, by
examining its direct e¤ect via  as well as its indirect one via changes in the magnitude, and possibly
precision, of . Second, we undertake a heterogeneity analysis, testing whether the main e¤ect is
50The case of 1-year lag is already considered under the baseline estimation, and hence not presented in this
analysis.
51Note that the number of observations may change between cases, due to data availability of the various additional
controls.
52Notice that it can take the subscript j or i, depending on whether Z is at the rm or industry level.
23
systematically di¤erent across initial levels of the measure tested, by examining the properties of
the parameter .
We start with the potential connection between managers and skilled labor.53 We measure the
latter through the 3-digit industry level ratio of non-production workers to all workers, being the
standard skill intensity measure used in the literature.54 This measure is obtained from Ghosh
(2014) (1990-2000),55 and the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (2001-2006).56 Previous studies
indicate that globalization increases the demand for skill in developing economies (Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2007)). This, in turn, may a¤ect the demand for managers. To test this, in Column (1)
we add the skill intensity variable. The coe¢ cient  remains stable and precise, suggesting that
skill in the broader sense, measured via the demand for non-production workers, is not a prominent
intermediate channel. In addition, the interaction of skill with InpTar indicates that there is no
apparent di¤erential e¤ect across industriesbenchmark skill intensity levels.57
Second, we test the e¤ect of capital intensity. Our key variable, intermediate inputs, is a ow
measure of incoming equipment. The stock value of capital, which includes non-equipment stock as
well, may also a¤ect the demand for managers. For instance, capital intensive production processes
may involve automation and hence less problem solving and less demand for managers, compared
to labor intensive production technologies. To test the role of capital intensity in our main e¤ect,
in Column (2) we add rmsGVA share of capital employed. Its direct e¤ect is weakly positive
and statistically imprecise, providing no support that the stock of capital is correlated with the
compensation share of managers. Importantly,  does not change relative to the benchmark case,
indicating that the e¤ect of the incoming ow of equipment on the relative demand for managers
holds regardless of whether the rm is relatively capital intensive. Notably, the interaction of this
measure with InpTar does not point at systematic di¤erential e¤ects across capital intensity levels.
53At rst glance it may be susceptible that skill and managers might be correlated through the standard denition
of skill in the literature which considers non-production workers or otherwise those in white collar occupations.
Note however that this denition, while covering also managers, includes various additional occupations that do not
necessarily hold managerial positions. For instance, in the cases of Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) and Zhu and
Treer (2005), skilled workers are dened to hold the following positions within the manufacturing sector: manager,
professional, technician, and clerical worker; indeed managers represent a subset of that, though the other professions
can fall under the non-managers classication.
54Proxying skill intensity by non-production is non-trivial, though this is common practice by necessity, given
data limitations. Indeed, this measure is adopted by various studies on trade liberalization and skill in developing
countries (e.g. Raveh and Reshef (2016), Zhu and Treer (2005)). In addition, Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994)
show that the production/non-production worker classication is a good proxy for skilled and unskilled workers.
55We thank Sangeeta Ghosh for sharing this data.
56Notably, our proxies for the relative demand for managers and skill intensity do not correlate strongly at the
industry level ( =  0:13); an outcome of examining one occupation in a larger set of non-production ones.
57Given the potential importance of this measure in our analysis, in the Appendix we further verify that similar
results are yielded when this measure, together with its interactions with the treatment, are added to the initial,
trade-based analysis presented in Section 3.2. This is discussed in Appendix H, with the results presented in Appendix
Table 19.
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Third, we test the e¤ect of productivity. Previous research shows that trade liberalization
increases rm productivity (e.g. Topalova and Khandelwal (2011)). Higher productivity may
increase the demand for managers due, for instance, to its potential e¤ects on organizational design
(Garicano (2000)).58 To test its intermediate e¤ect, we add in Column (3) a measure of productivity.
We follow Ahsan (2013) and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), and adopt the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) methodology to construct rm-level TFP. The latter controls for the potential simultaneity
in the production function by using rms raw material inputs as a proxy for the unobservable
productivity shocks.59 The estimated  indicates that productivity is not associated with the
relative demand for managers. However,  holds its magnitude and signicance, suggesting that
productivity is not a key intermediate channel. The estimated  does not point at systematic
di¤erential patterns across productivity levels.
Fourth, we examine the role of export tari¤s. During our sample period there were various
multilateral trade liberalization episodes, such as for instance the 1995 Uruguay round, that a¤ected
the access of Indian rms to foreign markets. This, in turn, may have altered the demand for
managers, irrespective of the domestic trade reforms. To test this, we control for export tari¤s. This
measure was constructed using HS6-level bilateral tari¤ data from the TRAINS-WITS database,
for our sample period. In particular, we considered the cases that India is listed as an exporter.
Using these, the tari¤s of each industry were averaged over all trade partners, with the weight
for each partner being its share in the Indian exports of that industry in 1990, calculated using
data from the UN-COMTRADE database. Formally, we compute export tari¤s,  exp ortj;t , as follows:
 exp ortj;t =
P
m am;jm;j;t, where m;j;t is the tari¤ on industry j at time t for importing country m,
and am;j is the share of Indian exports (out of its total exports in industry j) to importerm in 1990.
We then mapped the export tari¤s to the 4-digit NIC 2004 level using the Debroy and Santhanam
(1993) concordance table. This measure is added in Column (4). The estimates indicate that the
main result holds. This is in line with the observation that the main patterns are applicable in
both exporting and non-exporting rms. Interestingly, however, the coe¢ cient on the additional
interaction term is negative and signicant, implying that reductions in export tari¤s intensify the
main e¤ect in input-liberalized industries.
Fifth, an additional potential determinant relates to management technology. In a recent study
58This may be especially prominent in the Indian economy. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) estimate that the 90th to
the 10th percentiles of rmsTFP in India is 5.0, whereas Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013)
nd that more productive Indian rms are also better managed.
59For rm i, in industry j, at time t, if !i;j;t is an unobservable productivity shock that might be correlated with the
rms choice of variable inputs, and demand function for intermediate inputs is monotonic in the rms productivity,
then Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) show that raw materials expenditure can act as a proxy for the unobservable
shocks, which in turn enables to estimate the corresponding production function and TFP levels. See Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) for further details.
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Chen (2017) connects between trade liberalization and management technology. If better man-
agement technology requires a higher volume and quality of managers, it may represent a viable
channel. To test this, we follow Chen (2017) and proxy management technology through the cross
country-industry management survey done by Bloom and Van Reenen (2010). Surveying a large
number of rms in various manufacturing industries in India (among other countries) throughout
2004, Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) construct a measure for management quality in di¤erent sec-
tors.60 This index is a number between 1 and 5, with 5 representing the best quality. Given this
measure is available for only one year, its average e¤ect is absorbed by ; hence, we focus on its
interaction with InpTar. The estimates in Column (5) indicate that input-trade liberalization does
not have a systematically di¤erent e¤ect on the relative demand for managers across industries
level of management technology.
Last, in Column (6) we include all the additional controls and their interactions with the input
tari¤s. This is a relatively demanding specication, in terms of potential multicollinearity. However,
our primary coe¢ cient of interest, , remains negative and signicant, similar to the benchmark
estimates.
3.3.10 Robustness tests
As a nal step, we conduct a few robustness tests to examine the persistency and stability of our
main result. Results in this section are reported in Table 11. First, in Columns (1)-(4) we test
our benchmark estimation under various specications: using an industry-level and log versions of
our dependent variable, as well as estimating a rst-di¤erence and Arellano-Bond (Arellano and
Bond (1991)) versions of Equation (5), respectively. Although the magnitude slightly uctuates,
the main result remains to hold in sign and signicance in all cases.
Second, we estimate a specication that adds the average wage of executive managers in the
previous period to the baseline specication. Under the assumption that managerswages factor-
in the (expected) quality of managers, based on their past experience and personal traits, this
additional measure controls for managers quality at the time of the shock. The estimates in
Column (5) indicate that the main result is robust to this addition.
Third, we estimate the baseline specication while restricting the sample to post-1992 years.
This restriction addresses potential endogeneity concerns related to the usage of Indias input-
output matrix in 1993-1994 by setting the initial year of the sample to 1993. The outcome in
Column (6) indicates that the main result remains to hold under this restriction.
60The index is available at the 3-digit SIC level. We map this to 2-digit HS level via WITS correspondence tables,
and thereafter to 2-digit NIC 2004 via the Debroy and Santhanam (1993) concordance table.
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Fourth, we test a di¤erent trade liberalization measure imports normalized by domestic sales,
being the import penetration measure used in Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2010). We use it in
lieu of TGV A in specication (4). The result appears in Column (7), providing further support for
the robustness of our key observation through the precision and sign of the coe¢ cient of interest.
Last, we follow Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010) and consider a rm-level
input tari¤measure. We do so by interacting the industry-level input tari¤s with rmsGVA share
of capital employed; formally, FirmTari;t = InpTarj;t  capGV Ai;t. The intensity of capital employed
is a direct measure of input intensity. The interaction, therefore, provides rm-level variation in
the extent to which input tari¤s may a¤ect the rm. To that end, we examine this measure in
the precedent period, FirmTari;t 1, and add it to Equation (5) in lieu of InpTarj;t 1. Given the
rm-level perspective we in addition exclude t and Ind  Trendj , and instead include j  t. The
outcome appears in Column (8), indicating that the main result remains to hold.
3.4 Discussion of results
Let us summarize the main results of our empirical analysis, and provide some further interpre-
tations. The key ndings were that imported inputs, and equivalently decreases in input tari¤s,
increase the compensation and number of managers, in relative and absolute terms, and across its
components. This result was shown to be persistent, economically meaningful, robust to a myriad
of tests and potential channels, and relatively more dominant in the short term. Digging deeper,
the analysis pointed at the domestic, family-run rms that operate in relatively exible labor mar-
kets, and use the imported inputs to produce intermediate goods, as those that drive the patterns
observed. In addition, it revealed that neither rmssize nor export decision alter this. Last, it
suggested that the role of import competition in this is relatively weak, and hence emphasized the
potential importance of technology-driven changes in the production side.
Two key questions remain open. First, how do these ndings may be important for under-
standing some of the key questions related to the impact of trade policies? Second, what are the
potential underlying mechanisms that drive these results? In an attempt to address these questions,
we draw on previous related empirical and theoretical research, and consider a possible conceptual
framework that brings the above ndings together.
Starting with the rst question, the ndings of this study may shed light on central issues
related to the rm-level impacts of trade policies; specically, those related to their e¤ect on
rm productivity, and growth. This is suggested by a growing body of empirical literature that
links management practices and quality, to rm productivity, performance, and growth. Some of
the studies that provide evidence for this include Bloom, Brynjolfsson, Foster, Jarmin, Saporta-
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Eksten, and Van Reenen (2013), Bloom, Lemos, Sadun, Scur, and Van Reenen (2014), Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007), Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2015),
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004), and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). For instance,
Bloom, Lemos, Sadun, Scur, and Van Reenen (2014) estimate that approximately a quarter of the
cross-country and within-country TFP gaps can be accounted for by di¤erences in management
practices. Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) suggest that this may be even
more prominent in the Indian context.61 While empirical analysis of these issues is beyond the
scope of the current e¤ort, the patterns we report point at a relatively understudied link between
trade liberalization, and rm productivity and growth.
Moving to the second question, there is a line of empirical research that is quite revealing of the
economic e¤ects of the trade reform we investigate. Based on it, we identify three key outcomes of
input-trade liberalization: rst, it increases productivity (Ahsan (2013), Bas and Berthou (2017),
and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011)); second, it increases product variety (Goldberg, Khandel-
wal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010)); third, it decreases marginal costs and increases markups
(De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016)). Notably, all of the three outcomes sug-
gest that input-liberalized rms undergo a demand shock. Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)
o¤er a theory in which rms that experience such a shock increase the number of management
layers, based on the notion of knowledge hierarchies (Garicano (2000)), whereby rms economize
on the problem solving process. This is consistent with the observed increase in product variety,
pointing more directly at rm expansion. Both options suggest that the new knowledge arriving via
decreased input tari¤s yields an organizational expansion, and a demand for problem solving, that
in turn increases the demand for managers, manifested via increases in their wages, bonuses, and
number. The potential endogeneity of the previous outcomes to changes in managerial incentives
may intensify this. Our results in addition suggest that this process may be stronger in family-run
rms, where professional management is initially scarce.
Last, the potential role of capital-skill complementarity in this deserves further comment.62 Our
ndings indicate that capital imports increase the share of managerial compensation. The analyses
in Section 3.3.9 and Appendix H suggest that these patterns are not driven by complementarities
between capital and skill, as the main (and initial, trade-based) results are robust to holding the
industry skill intensity level constant. To the extent that non-managers are relatively low-skilled,
this is further strengthened by the observation in Section 3.3.3 that non-managerial compensation
61Through a eld experiment involving Indian textile rms they nd that better management practices can increase
productivity by 17% in the rst year, and lead to rm expansions within three years.
62The notion that capital may substitute low-skilled labor, often referred to as the capital-skill complementarity
hypothesis, has been studied extensively in the literature (see e.g. Griliches (1969), and Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull,
and Violante (2000)).
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is relatively non-responsive to changes in input tari¤s.
Nonetheless, we note the following. First, managers represent only a sub-set of the more general
group of skilled labor.63 Hence, the non-managers group may include both high and low skilled
labor (which are indistinguishable in our data). Under these circumstances, it may be that the
observed patterns are driven to some extent by capital-skill complementarity, and non-managerial
compensation appears non-responsive to imported capital because of the conicting e¤ects of im-
ported capital on the high and low skilled labor within that group. Second, as noted the skill
intensity measure employed in the analysis, namely the share of non-production workers, does not
provide a clear mapping to the group of skilled labor, and is in addition available only at the 3-digit
NIC 2004 level. This limits the extent to which the analysis can identify complementarities between
inputs and skill and assess their importance in driving the results.
4 Conclusion
Understanding the e¤ects of globalization on the labor market is of rst-order importance. One
aspect of this relates to intermediate inputs. Previous research indicate that input-trade liberal-
ization brings new inputs and technologies. Studying their profound impact on productivity and
output, the literature overlooked their potential e¤ect on the demand for managing the new in-
coming knowledge. This may be prominent in light of the recently emerging literature on the
link between trade liberalization and rm organization and its e¤ects on productivity, especially
in developing economies for which evidence on the trade-organization nexus are scarce. Hence,
examining the association between imported inputs and managerial incentives may shed light on
central issues such as the rm-level e¤ects of trade policies. This paper made a rst empirical
attempt to ll this gap.
Adopting the case of India, we asked: can input-trade liberalization increase the demand for
managers? Using a rich rm-level data set that uniquely distinguishes between the compensations
of managers and non-managers in the Indian manufacturing sector, and exploiting the exogenous
nature of Indias Eight-Plan trade reform, we investigated the potential causal link between input-
trade liberalization and the demand for managers relative to non-managers. A preliminary analysis
showed that trade liberalization interacts with the relative demand for managers through imports,
and more specically, through those of intermediate inputs motivating our focus on changes in
input tari¤.
63While it is plausible to assume that managers are skilled, it is not the case that all the skilled are managers;
some will inevitably be non-managers. This is further observed via the relatively low correlation between our the
industry-level measures of skill intensity and the demand for managers noted previously.
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The main analysis established a causal link: decreases in input tari¤s increase the relative de-
mand for managers in a remarkably robust and persistent way that is also economically meaningful;
a 10% decrease in input tari¤s increases the compensation share of managers by approximately
1   1:5%, via increases in the number as well as average wages and bonuses of managers. Inter-
estingly, this result is not a direct outcome of potential connections between managers and skill,
productivity, capital intensity, export tari¤s, or management technology. Further investigations
identied the input-importing domestically owned rms that produce intermediate goods as those
that trigger the result. These patterns were: (i) observed across the rmssize distribution; (ii)
applicable in both exporting and non-exporting rms; (iii) stronger in family-run rms that op-
erate under exible labor market regulations; (iv) relatively more dominant in the short-run. In
addition, we showed that unlike changes in input tari¤s, import competition does not a¤ect the
relative demand for managers.
The results of this study have various implications. Policy-wise, given the established connec-
tion between better management technology and productivity, our results highlight the potential
signicance that trade liberalization may have in this, most notably that in intermediate inputs.
In addition, the paper stresses the need to study the dynamics of rms in developing economies
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Notes: Figure presents the average GVA share of trade (exports plus imports) and the average
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Figure 2: Relative Demand for Managers, Importers and Non-Importers, 1990-2006
Notes: Figure presents the average compensation share of managersfor importing and non-importing
rms, 1990-2006
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Figure 3: Average Compensation Share of Managers across Industries, 1990-2006
Notes: Figure presents the average compensation share of managers across NIC 2004 2-digit level
industries, 1990-2006
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Figure 4: Average Number of Executive Managers, 1990-2006
Notes: Figure presents the average number of executive managers, 1990-2006
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Figure 5: Average Number of Executive Managers, Importers and Non-Importers, 1990-2006
Notes: Figure presents the average number of executive managers for importing and non-importing rms,
1990-2006
42
Table 1: Firms with Managerial Compensation VS. Firms without Managerial Compensation
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Firms with Reported ManagersCompensation
R&D intensity 0:11 0:02 12:78 0 2163
Capital Employed/GVA 8:23 1:74 142:78 0 16789
GVA 1354:48 162:7 15604:67 0:1 931260
Panel B: Firms with no Reported ManagersCompensation
R&D intensity 0:003 0 0:27 0 89:85
Capital Employed/GVA 2:17 0 43:67 0 7227
GVA 316:1 62:8 2458:59 0:1 130587
Notes: Panel A (B) covers rms that reported positive (zero) managerial compensation. R&D intensityis
the GVA share of R&D expenditure and royalty payments for technical knowhow. GVAis gross value
added, dened as total sales minus total raw material expenditure. Capital Employedis the amount of



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A1: Relative Demand for Managers, Importers and Non-Importers, by Size Quartiles,
1990-2006
Notes: Figure presents the average compensation share of managers for importing and non-importing rms,
divided to size quartiles. Size quartiles are dened according to the GVA of a rm (1st [4th] quarter
representing the rms with the least [highest] GVA). The period covered is 1990-2006.
C Data
We use an annual-based panel of Indian rms that covers 8,000 rms, across 108 (4-digit level)
industries within the manufacturing sector, over the period of 1990-2006 (with the exception of
specic cases, where specied so). Unless otherwise specied, variables are based on data from the
PROWESS database of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). All monetary-based
variables are measured in millions of Rupees, deated to 2005 using the industry-specic Wholesale
Price Index (derived from Allcott, Collard-Wexler, and OConnell (2016)). All industry-level cases
are based on the 2004 National Industrial Classication (NIC).
Variable denitions
Mcomp/Tcomp: The share of managerial compensation in total labor compensation; compen-
sation dened as the sum of all salaries, and additional bonuses.
Imp/GVA: Share of total imports in Gross Value Added.
ImpRaw/GVA: Share of raw material imports in Gross Value Added.
ImpCap/GVA: Share of capital imports in Gross Value Added.
ImpSto/GVA: Share of stores and spares imports in Gross Value Added.
ImpFin/GVA: Share of nal goods imports in Gross Value Added.
Exp/GVA: Share of total exports in Gross Value Added.
GVA: Gross Value Added; dened as the di¤erence between total sales and expenditures on
raw materials.
Age: Age of a rm in years.
R&D intensity: Share of R&D expenditure and royalty payments for technical knowhow in
Gross Value Added.
Assets: Total rm assets.
Productivity: Firm TFP computed using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology.
Input/Output tari¤s: HS 6-digit level output tari¤ data are derived from the TRAINS-WITS
tari¤ database. We use Indias input-output matrix for 1993-1994 to construct input tari¤s,  inputj;t ,




k;t , where 
output
k;t is the tari¤ on industry k at time t, and ak;j is
the share of industry k in the value of industry j. We concord both the input and output tari¤s to
the 4-digit NIC 2004 level using the Debroy and Santhanam (1993) concordance table.
Export tari¤s: We use the HS 6-digit level bilateral tari¤s, derived from the TRAINS-WITS
database, that are reported under the cases that India is listed as an exporter. The tari¤s of each
industry were averaged over all trade partners, with the weight for each partner being its share
in the Indian exports of that industry in 1990, calculated using data from the UN-COMTRADE





m;j;t is the tari¤ on industry j at time t for importer m, and am;j is the share of Indian exports
(out of its total exports in industry j) to importer m in 1990. We concord the export tari¤s to the
4-digit NIC 2004 level using the Debroy and Santhanam (1993) concordance table.
Famliy share: The rms ownership share of Hindu undivided families, averaged over 2007-2009.
A Hindu undivided family is one that consists of all persons lineally descendent from a common
ancestor. The main indicator used in the analysis is a binary index that takes the value 1 if the
rm has a positive level of ownership by Hindu undivided families.
Cap/GVA: Share of total capital employed in Gross Value Added. Capital includes equipment
and structures.
Skill intensity: The 3-digit NIC 2004 level ratio of non-production workers to all workers,
obtained from the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (2001-2006) and from Ghosh (2014) (1990-
2000).
Management technology: The 2-digit NIC 2004 level management quality score in 2004. The
score is obtained from Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) in 3-digit SIC classication, which was
mapped to the 2-digit HS level and thereafter to 2-digit NIC 2004 via the Debroy and Santhanam
(1993) concordance table. The score is between 1 and 5, with 5 denoting the highest quality.
Labor regulation: State-level labor regulation index in 1990. The index is derived from Aghion,
Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2008) and is based on the state-level index constructed in Besley
and Burgess (2004). The index ranges from -2 to 4, with -2 (4) denoting labor regulations that
are pro-employer (employee); it excludes the following states: Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur,
Meghalaya, and Nagaland.
Executives/Directors/Non-managers compensation/wages/bonuses: Total compensation, wages,
or bonuses of executives, directors, or non-managers. Compensation is dened as the sum of wages
and bonuses. Executives are the top management with executive powers, directors are the mid-
ranked managers with no executive powers, and non-managers are workers who do not manage
others.
Executives: The number of executive managers.
ChinaImp/IndiaImp: Share of Chinese-sourced imports in Indian imports. HS 6-digit import
data are obtained from the UN-COMTRADE database, and matched to the 4-digit NIC 2004 level
using the Debroy and Santhanam (1993) concordance table.
D Derivations for the Analytical Framework
Considering the setting described in the main text, variable costs are given by c = wm m+wn n;
wm and wn being the wage rates of managers and non-managers, respectively. Firms operate in a
competitive industry, where factor prices are set accordingly. If m and n are the argmin of costs,
then c is the cost function. The logarithm of c can be approximated by a translog cost function:




2 + mn ln (wm) ln (wn) + nm ln (wn) ln (wm) + nn ln (wn)
2 +
MM ln (M)
2 + yy ln (y)
2] + mM ln (wm) ln (M) + my ln (wm) ln (y) +
nM ln (wn) ln (M) + ny ln (wn) ln (y) + My ln (M) ln (y) ;
where y is output. Symmetry implies mn = nm. By Shephards lemma, @c=@wm = m, so that












Using this in the translog we get:
S = m + mm ln (wm) + mn ln (wn) + mM ln (M) + my ln (y) :
By linear homogeneity of cost with respect to prices, cost shares are homogenous of degree zero.
Therefore mm+mn = 0. By linear homogeneity of the production function we have mM+my =
0; increasing all inputs by same factor increases output by same factor, but this should not a¤ect
the cost share. Using these two properties gives Equation (1).
E Endogeneity of Input Tari¤s to ManagersCompensation
We test the conjecture that input-trade liberalization may be a¤ected by past levels of managers
compensation at the industry level. This may be a potential route of endogeneity because, for
instance, managers in industries that enable them to extract a relatively larger share of the prots
may have a greater incentive to inuence trade policies implemented by the Indian government. To
test this, we follow the baseline specication (outlined in the text) to estimate the following model:
Tarj;t = + (COMP )j;t n + Xi;t 1 + i + t + (Ind  Trend)j + i;t:
Notation is consistent with that described in the text, with the exception of Tar, COMP; and
n. Specically, Tar 2 (InpTar; ; OutTar), where InpTar (OutTar) are input (output) tar-
i¤s. COMP 2 (McompTcomp ; ExecWage), where McompTcomp is the compensation share of managers, and
ExecWage is the per-executive wage. Note that each of the compensation and tari¤ measures
presents the industry (j) average at the 4-digit NIC 2004 level. Last, n 2 [1; 3]. Hence, we test the
association of either of the two compensation measures, each being in one to three year lags, with
the contemporaneous level of either output or input tari¤s.
Results appear in Appendix Tables 14 and 15. The former (latter) examines the case of input
(output) tari¤s. In each, Columns (1)-(3) ((4)-(6)) test the cases of McompTcomp (ExecWage), under
each of the three lags. In all cases the estimated  indicates that there is no apparent association
between past industry-level compensation measures and trade liberalization, further supporting the
exogenous nature of the trade shocks examined.
F Governance Structure and the Relative Demand for Managers
We examine two additional standard (time-varying) measures of governance structure, derived
from PROWESS. The rst (Indep) looks into the number of independent directors in the board
of directors, normalized by GVA. The second (BOD) captures the size of the board of directors,
normalized by GVA. Notably, only a relatively small fraction of the rms in our sample report these
measures, hence the sample size in this analysis is signicantly restricted.
We estimate two specications with these measures; both follow the baseline model outlined
in the text. The rst estimates the heterogeneous e¤ects of input-trade liberalization on the rel-
ative compensation of managers across governance levels. The second tests whether input-trade
liberalization a¤ects the extent of the governance structure.
Hence, for the rst case we estimate the following model:
Mcomp
Tcomp i;t
= +  ln(InpTar)j;t 1 + Gi;t 1 +  ln(InpTar G)i;t 1
+ Xi;t 1 + i + t + (Ind  Trend)j + i;t:
The second case is estimated via the following model:
Gi;t = +  ln(InpTar)j;t 1 + Xi;t 1 + i + t + (Ind  Trend)j + i;t:
Notation is consistent with that described in the text, with the exception of G. Specically,
G 2 (Indep;BOD) where Indep and BOD are as described above. Results appear in Appendix
Table 17. Columns (1) and (2) follow the rst specication, whereas Columns (3) and (4) follow
the second. The estimates in all cases suggest that input-trade liberalization: i) does not lead to
heterogeneous e¤ects on the compensation share of managers across levels of these two measures;
ii) does not a¤ect the level of these two measures.
G Labor Market Regulations and the Relative Demand for Man-
agers
We examine an additional cross-sectional state-level measure of labor market regulations, derived
from Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar (2009). In e¤ect, this measure is based on the one constructed
by Besley and Burgess (2004), employed in the text, yet it incorporates further revisions of it
made in Bhattacharjea (2006), and the OECD (2007). It takes the values of -1, 0, or 1. The
rst/second/third represents inexible (pro-employer)/neutral/exible (pro-employee) labor mar-
ket regulations. Similar to the index of Besley and Burgess (2004), the following states are excluded:
Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, and Nagaland.
Hence, we estimate variates of the following model:
Mcomp
Tcomp i;t
= +  ln(InpTar)j;t 1 + Labori +  ln(InpTar  Labor)i;t 1
+ Xi;t 1 + i + t + (Ind  Trend)j + i;t:
Notation is similar to that described in the text, with Labor representing the labor market
regulations index described above, interacted with the rmsstate-location. Notice that its average
e¤ect is absorbed by , given that it has no time variation. Results appear in Appendix Table
18. Columns (1) and (2), follow Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8. The positive and signicant s
indicate that the patterns observed under this additional measure are similar to those estimated
with the baseline index described in the text: input-trade liberalization a¤ects the compensation
share of managers more strongly in states with laxer, pro-worker labor market regulations.
H Skill Intensity and Trade
To better observe the role of skill intensity in our analysis, we replicate Table 3, adding our proxy
for skill intensity (in t   1) as a regressor in each of the regressions, with its interaction with the
variable of interest in each case (either imports, imported inputs, or imported capital goods). The
details of the skill intensity measure are outlined in the main text (Section 3.3.9), as well as in the
Appendix. Additional di¤erences from Table 3 include: (i) the exclusion of its Column 2, as in
the current case it is redundant to Table 3s Column 3 in which both imports and exports are
included concurrently; (ii) the exclusion of industry-year xed e¤ects, which otherwise would absorb
the skill intensity measure (given it is at the industry-level), and the inclusion of industry-specic
time trends instead.
The results are presented in Table 19. Columns 1-4 replicate Columns 1, 3, 4, and 5 of Table
3, respectively, with the above mentioned modications. As observed, the key results discussed
in Section 3.2 remain to hold in sign, signicance, and magnitude in each of the cases, despite
controlling for skill intensity and its interactions. In addition, the latter indicate that there is no
apparent di¤erential e¤ect across industriesbenchmark skill intensity levels, similar to the patterns
observed in Section 3.3.9.
